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COMMENTS
Tufts-THE RESURRECTION OF Crane's FOOTNOTE 37
JANET JACOBOWITZ
I. INTRODUCTION
The message of what appeared to be "obvious" to the Supreme
Court in "the most famous footnote in tax history,"1 footnote 37 of
Crane v. Commissioner," has at last surfaced. The Fifth Circuit, in
Tufts v. Commissioners became the first court to concede to the
"obviously" with which footnote 37 begins. The Tufts decision,
however, is in direct conflict with both the Third Circuit' and the
Tax Court.5 Although Tufts may be indicative of a judicial desire
to impede the expansion of the Crane doctrine, to the tax shelter
industry' it renews the speculation that has surrounded footnote
37 and its implication of help for tax shelters ever since the Su-
preme Court decided Crane.
1. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277
(1978).
2. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Footnote 37 states:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a
mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mort-
gage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiv-
ing boot. That is not this case.
Id. at 14. For a compilation of what the commentators have said regarding footnote 37, see
McGuire, Tax Shelter Partnerships-Liabilities in Excess of Basis, 36 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAX 1443, 1451-53 (1978).
Briefly, Crane stands for the dual principles that the basis of property includes nonre-
course debt encumbering it, and that upon disposition of such property, at a time when the
value of the property exceeds the debt, the amount realized includes the full amount of the
nonrecourse debt. See discussion accompanying notes 7-31, infra. See generally, Adams,
Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court
Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, supra note 1; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount
Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U.
PA. L. REv. 69 (1969); Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32 TAX LAW. 289 (1978).
3. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981). Tufts held that where the fair market value of property
is less than the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage, the amount realized upon disposition
is limited to the fair market value. See discussion accompanying notes 85-105 infra.
4. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). See
discussion accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
5. Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491
(1979); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978); Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966);
Woodsam Associates, Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); Mendham
Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
6. Note, Millar: Requiem for Crane's Footnote 37, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 343, 352 (1980).
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The purpose of this comment is to examine Tufts v. Commis-
sioner, specifically its interpretation of footnote 37. This will be
accomplished through an analysis of Crane and post-Crane case
law, to the extent that this is necessary to understand the impact
that Crane has had on tax law. Since Tufts is the most recent and
divergent post-Crane decision, the bulk of the ensuing discussion
will focus on the underlying rationale of Tufts and its potential
effects.
II. Crane v. Commissioner
In order to comprehend the meaning and impact of footnote 37,
it is necessary to look to its progenitor, Crane v. Commissioner.
The petitioner, Beulah Crane, inherited from her husband a build-
ing and lot subject to a mortgage of approximately $262,000.7 The
value of the property at the time of the inheritance was equal to
the amount of the encumbrance. During the next seven years,
Crane reported the gross rentals as income and claimed the allowa-
ble deductions for taxes, expenses, and physical exhaustion of the
building. She was at no time personally liable on the mortgage. Af-
ter seven years, Crane sold the property, subject to the mortgage,
for $3,000 cash, out of which she paid $500 in expenses.8
Crane reported a capital gain of $1,250. 9 She contended that the
property she had acquired and sold was the equity only, which was
the value of the building and lot in excess of the mortgage. Since
the equity was zero when Crane acquired the property, she argued
that she realized a net capital gain of $2,500. The Commissioner,
however, contended that Crane realized a net gain of approxi-
mately $27,500, reasoning that the 'property' acquired and sold
was not the equity. . . but rather the physical property itself, or
the owner's rights to possess, use, and dispose of it, undiminished
by the mortgage." 10 From the original basis of $262,000, the allow-
able depreciation of $28,000 was subtracted, resulting in an ad-
justed basis of $179,000. The amount realized on the sale of the
property, the Commissioner argued, included both the $2,500 cash
and the amount of the mortgage, which totaled $257,500 and which
7. 331 U.S. at 3. The principal of the mortgage was $255,000 and interest in default
amounted to approximately $7,000. Id.
8. Id. at 4.
9. She realized a net amount of cash of $2,500. Under § 117(a),(b), Int. Rev. Code of
1939, (now I.R.C. § 1221), 50% of the gain realized upon the sale of capital asset was tax-
able. 331 U.S. at 4 n.3.
10. Id. at 4.
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produced a taxable gain of $27,500.11
The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner on several
grounds. It first determined that "property" as used to determine
"basis" under the applicable statutory provision must be construed
according to its "ordinary, everyday" meaning. This does not en-
compass the definition of equity.12 Thus, property must mean a
physical object which is owned, or the legal rights to control that
object."3 The Court also refused to construe "equity" to mean
"property" for basis purposes because such a construction would
hinder the determination of depreciation deductions and subse-
quent adjustments to basis. If the "basis" is the equity, and the
depreciation is computed on an "equity basis," the deductions
would "represent only a fraction of the cost of the corresponding
physical exhaustion. 14 On the other hand, if depreciation were
computed on the full value of the property, but deducted from an
"equity basis," the result would be a negative basis or the denial of
deductions altogether. The Court was unwilling to approve either
of these results." Thus, the Court summarized that "the applicable
provisions. . . expressly preclude an equity basis, and the use of it
is contrary to certain implicit principles of income tax deprecia-
tion, and entails very great administrative difficulties."Is
The next hurdle for the Court was to determine the "amount
realized" upon the sale of the property. The Court decided that
the term "property" as used to determine "amount realized'
must have the same meaning as used to determine "basis."
18
11. Id. at 4-5. Crane sustained a capital loss on the land, of which $264 was taken into
account, and an ordinary gain on the building of $24,000. The adjusted basis included the
$179,000 allocable to the building and $55,000 to the land. Id.
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 113(a)(5) (now I.R.C. § 1014). Section 113(a)(5) was applica-
ble to determine her basis since the property was acquired by devise.
13. 331 U.S. at 6.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 9-10.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 111(b) (now I.R.C. § 1001(b)).
18. 331 U.S. at 13. Gain or loss and amount realized are defined in I.R.C. § 1001(a) and
(b) (substantially unchanged from §§ 111(a) and (b), respectively, of the 1939 Code) as
follows:
(a) COMPUTATION OF GAIN OR Loss--The gain from the sale or other disposi-
tion of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the
adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be
the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over
the amount realized.
(b) AMOUNT REMLIza--The amount realized from the sale or other disposition
of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
1981]
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Therefore, the amount of the mortgage should be included in the
amount realized on the sale of the property. The "gain" was the
amount realized less the "adjusted basis." 1' Thus, the definition of
amount realized was expanded to include a nonrecourse mortgage
as the economic equivalent to cash. In recognition of the fact that
the seller need not receive money or property to realize gain, the
Court stated:
[A] mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the
property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration,
realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as well as the
boot. If a purchaser pays boot, it is immaterial as to our problem
whether the mortgagor is also to receive money from the pur-
chaser to discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or whether he is
merely to transfer subject to the mortgage .... We are rather
concerned with the reality that an owner of property, mortgaged
at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and
will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were
his personal obligations. If he transfers subject to the mortgage,
the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage
were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had
been assumed by another."0
This statement by the Court would appear to limit Crane to those
situations in which a mortgagor sells the property subject to a
(nonrecourse) mortgage and receives additional consideration in
the form of "boot." It implies that the value of the property must
be greater than the mortgage.
Footnote 37, however, casts doubt on whether Crane is so lim-
ited. It states:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of
the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot re-
alize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different
the property (other than money) received ....
(emphasis added). The code obviously defines "amount realized" in terms of money or prop-
erty actually received. Thus, Crane was a judicial expansion of the statutory meaning of
"amount realized."
19. Adjusted basis is defined in I.R.C. § 1011 (which is substantially unchanged from §
113(b), 1939 Code):
(a) GENERAL RuLE--The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from
the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis. ..
adjusted as provided in Section 1016.
Section 1016 provides the guidelines for adjustments to basis.
20. 331 U.S. at 14.
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problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the
property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiv-
ing boot. That is not this case.""
This footnote has evoked a great deal of controversy and specula-
tion.2 It has been construed as mere dictum, 8 an answer to a hy-
pothetical question, 4 and finally in Tufts v. Commissioner as an
express limitation on Crane.
A. The Theories Behind Crane
Crane is often justified on two theories: the tax benefit theory
and the economic benefit theory.' 5 The rationale of the tax benefit
theory is that since a taxpayer claims deductions computed upon
basis including the nonrecourse mortgage, the amount realized
upon disposition must include the amount of the mortgage. The
taxpayer must "pay back" any previously claimed deductions.' In
Crane, this rationale is readily apparent; the taxpayer claimed de-
ductions on basis which included the mortgage and therefore must
pay back the previously claimed deductions by realizing the
amount of the equity and the mortgage upon disposition and pay-
ing income tax on the total gain. The Court seemed to emphasize
this rationale when it stated, "[tihe crux of this case, really, is
whether the law permits [taxpayers] to exclude allowable deduc-
tions from consideration in computing gain.'
7
The Crane Court also relied on the economic benefit theory.'8
21. Id. at n.37.
22. See discussion accompanying notes 63-84 infra. See generally Millar v. Commis-
sioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
23. Id. at 215. Comment, Non-Recourse Liabilities: A Tax Shelter, 29 BAYLOR L. REV.
57, 73 (1977).
24. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 83-85. See also, Bittker, supra note 1, at 282.
25. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 83-84 and n.81; Comment, supra note 23, at 73.
26. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 83-84 and n.81; Comment, supra note 23, at 74; cf. Bitt-
ker, supra note 1, at 282. Professor Bittker feels that the Supreme Court chose to treat
nonrecourse loans the same as personal liability for "administrative simplicity," and not
because the taxpayer received an economic benefit. He states:
Relief from a nonrecourse debt is not an economic benefit if it can be obtained
only by giving up the mortgaged property. It is analagous to the relief one obtains
from local real property taxes by disposing of the property- Like nonrecourse debt,
the taxes must be paid to retain the property; but no one would suggest that the
disposition of unprofitable property produces an economic benefit equal to the
present value of the taxes that will not be paid in the future.
Id.
27. 331 U.S. at 15.
28. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 84.
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The thrust of this theory is that when property is subject to nonre-
course liens totalling less than (or equal to) the value of the prop-
erty, the owner is, in effect, personally liable since he can lose the
value of the property if it is foreclosed in satisfaction of the lien.2
The Court explained that if a mortgagor "transfers subject to the
mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the
mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal
amount had been assumed by another."30 Although, this economic
benefit may be apparent under the facts of Crane,3 1 the rationale
precludes its application when the value is less than the mortgage
since the value of property in a foreclosure cannot satisfy the lien.
Therefore, unlike Beulah Crane, the owner cannot be said to real-
ize an economic benefit equivalent to cash.3 Nevertheless, the
Crane doctrine-that the amount realized includes nonrecourse
debt-has been rigidly followed despite the fact that Crane was
limited to situations in which fair market value exceeded the non-
recourse liability.
B. The Crane Tax Shelter
Crane, by requiring nonrecourse debt to be included in basis,
has had a continuous impact on tax shelters structured with nonre-
course loans. High depreciation deductions can create losses which
the investor can offset against other income, thereby saving income
tax. At an extreme, an investor can, with minimal personal invest-
ment and large nonrecourse loans, secure a high basis for deprecia-
tion purposes. The result is deductions taken in excess of actual
cash investment, a process known as leveraging. The drawback to
leveraging stems from the other holding in Crane. Upon disposi-
tion (be it sale, foreclosure or abandonment), the amount realized
includes the full amount of the nonrecourse loan. The gain often
greatly exceeds any cash received. Such a gain is known as phan-
tom gain. Thus, the tax benefits incurred initially by the investor
in a typical tax shelter with nonrecourse debt are paid back as
taxes on the amount realized upon disposition. The investor might
still realize a benefit in that his taxes are deferred to a later date
and he might realize a capital gain although the deductions were
29. See Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 84; note 26 supra. But see Bittker, supra note 1, at
282.
30. 331 U.S. at 14.
31. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 84; Comment, supra note 23, at 74.
32. See, e.g. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060-63 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ordinary. In essence, the taxpayer receives an interest-free loan
from the government and an opportunity to convert ordinary in-
come to capital gain.'s
The use of nonrecourse loans in tax shelters, however, was sub-
stantially curtailed by the "at risk" limitations incorporated into
the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) by the Tax Reform Act of
1976.8' As a result of these changes, in most types of investments,
deductions are allowed only to the extent of personal liability, i.e.
cash "at risk." This severely curtails the utility of nonrecourse
loans. But, because real estate investments are not included in the
"at risk" limitation the implication of Crane on the use of nonre-
course debt in tax shelters continues. Furthermore, the disposition
of pre-"at risk" shelters will still be governed by Crane and foot-
note 37.86
The implication of footnote 37 to investors disposing of tax shel-
ters is that it presents the possibility of a great "bonanza." One
commentator, in discussing the surprisingly small number of cases
that have arisen from all the investments that lost money, sus-
pected the reason to be a reliance on footnote 37. As he put it:
[1]t is not uncommon for them [taxpayers and the professionals
who prepare tax returns] to disregard the possibility of gain on
the foreclosure or abandonment of a tax shelter on the authority
33. See generally TAx SHELTEEDm INvasTmEwrs (H. Enberg, ed. 1973); Del Cotto, supra
note 2, at 95; Comment, supra note 23, at 57.
34. I.R.C. § 465, as amended by The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204,
90 Stat. 1531 (1976). This section applies to individuals, electing small business corpora-
tions, and personal holding companies. Id. at 465(a). Under § 465(c), as enacted in 1976, the
limitations apply to the following activities: production or distribution of motion picture
films or video tapes, farming, equipment leasing, and the exploration or exploitation of oil
and gas resources. This was expanded in 1978 to cover all activities other than real estate.
The effect of this is that deductions are allowable only to the extent that the taxpayer con-
tributed money or other property, or is personally liable on amounts borrowed to finance
the investment. Id. at (b).
Section 465, as amended to apply to all activities other than real estate, curtailed the use
of nonrecourse debt in most tax shelters. In real estate, nonrecourse debt still provides tax
shelter opportunity.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) provides additional legislative remedies
to the tax shelter problem. It establishes a penalty for tax deductions taken from an inflated
basis. This new penalty is not deductible.
Additionally, as a result of ERTA, the incentive of tax shelters is reduced. The maximum
income tax rate is reduced from seventy to fifty percent effective in 1982. Thus, tax deduc-
tions will be less beneficial to the taxpayer. [1981] 13 Tax Notes 15, at 863, 865 (hereinafter
Tax Notes).
35. See e.g., Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981); Millar v. Commis-
sioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Freeland v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 970 (1980); Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979).
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of... [footnote 37], suggesting that gain cannot be realized on
the disposition of property subject to a nonrecourse debt in ex-
cess of its basis, unless the taxpayer receives cash or other prop-
erty to boot."
Until Tufts, those who invested in unprofitable tax shelters paid a
price; they had to pay back, at least in part, their interest-free
loans to the government. As a result of Tufts they no longer have
to repay this tax benefit.
III. POST-Crane CASE LAW
A. In General
The fact that Crane has had such continuous impact upon tax
law is testimony to its significance. Good or bad, Crane apparently
is here to stay and the Crane doctrine-that amount realized in-
cludes nonrecourse loans-has grown considerably since its birth.
The facts in Crane involved the acquisition of property by de-
vise and its subsequent disposition by sale. Theoretically, Crane
could have been limited precisely to this situation. In Blackstone
Theatre Co.,5 7 however, the Tax Court held that the Crane doc-
trine also applies to acquisitions by purchase. The petitioner in
Blackstone had purchased real estate subject to outstanding tax
liens in excess of $120,000. The tax liens were included in the
property's cost basis for purposes of depreciation. Several years
later, the petitioner purchased the tax liens for a reduced price of
approximately $50,000. The issue before the court was whether the
petitioner's basis, for purposes of depreciation, included the origi-
nal full amount of the outstanding tax liens. 8s The court, on the
authority of Crane, held that the liens were part of the cost basis,39
thereby expanding the Crane doctrine to purchased property.
Shortly thereafter, Parker v. Delaney settled the debate whether
Crane applies when property is abandoned upon foreclosure,
rather than is sold.40 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that
36. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 277. The "bonanza" lies in the fact that taxpayers have
been able to take large deductions, based upon a high basis which consists mostly of nonre-
course debt. Then, if the fair market value is lower than the debt at the time of disposition,
according to footnote 37, the amount realized is limited to the fair market value (rather
than the amount of the debt). See, e.g., Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d at 1058.
37. 12 T.C. 801 (1949).
38. Id. at 802.
39. Id. at 804-05.
40. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950); see Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 89.
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abandonment was within the meaning of "sale or other disposi-
tion. ' 41 Therefore, the taxpayer realized a gain equal to the full
amount of the mortgage when he abandoned the property.4' The
court reasoned:
They [the liens] are treated as cost at the earlier time [acquisi-
tion] and so must be treated as value at the later time [disposi-
tion]. The result in the end is that the taxpayer accounts to the
taxing authorities for the gain realized by his deductions for de-
preciation in excess of his own investment.
3
The court was apparently relying on the tax benefit theory because
its concern was that the taxpayer was able to claim deductions and
therefore he must repay them upon disposition.
Parker also applied Crane to dispositions of property in which
the value equals the amount of the mortgage. In Crane, the value
of the property upon disposition exceeded the amount of the mort-
gage. The court stated:
The added factor there [in Crane], not present here, that boot
was paid over and above the mortgage, is not material so long as
the value of the properties was not less than the liens. Boot
served to show this in the Crane case but the payment of boot is
of course not the only means of showing whether or not value is
equal to or more than the liens on the property disposed of. 4
This was the first explicit recognition that Crane applies when the
value equals the debt.
In Johnson v. Commissioner,45 the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a gift is a disposition that is equivalent to a sale in
the amount of a mortgage encumbering it.46 In Johnson, the tax-
payer transferred stock, which was the security for a loan taken
the same day, to an irrevocable trust. The amount of the loan was
held to be an amount realized to the taxpayer at the time of the
gift, thus resulting in taxable income.47 The court recognized that
41. Int. Rev. Code of 1931, § 111 (now I.R.C. § 1001(a)(b)).
42. 186 F.2d at 458-59.
43. Id. at 459.
44. Id. at 458.
45. 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974), affirming Joseph W.
Johnson, 59 T.C. 791; see also Estate of Levine, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. Joseph W. Johnson, 59 T.C. 791, aff'd 495 F.2d 1079; see Weiss supra note 2, at 303.
47. The value of the stock above the amount of the loan subjected the taxpayer to gift
tax liability. 495 F.2d at 1082.
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"[tlhe substance of a transaction rather than its form must ulti-
mately determine the tax liabilities of individuals, 4' and further
that "[t]he substance of the transactions in this case was a gift of
$500,000 worth of stock in exchange for $200,000."' Accordingly,
the $200,000 was an amount realized for purposes of computing
gain.50
Efforts have been made to expand Crane in ways other than
widening its application to different methods of disposition. Inves-
tors in tax shelters have relied on Crane to create high basis
through the use of large, sometimes questionable, nonrecourse
notes.51 Crane seemed to provide the authority for taxpayers to en-
large their basis as much as possible. Some efforts succeeded; some
did not.
In Manual D. Mayerson,52 the I.R.S. tried unsuccessfully to pre-
vent the taxpayer from including a purchase-money mortgage in
the basis of property he purchased. The taxpayer bought a
$332,500 building, financed by a 99-year nonrecourse note and
$10,000 cash payment. The Tax Court first determined that, under
authority of Crane, the absence of personal liability on the note
did not preclude its inclusion in basis.53 Furthermore, since the
court had already decided that the transaction was bona fide and
created a valid debt obligation, it determined that the length of
the term for maturity did not affect the validity of the debt obliga-
tion .6  The Mayerson court reached the only logical decision, in
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. A voluntary reconveyance, as opposed to the foreclosure in Parker, was held to con-
stitute a sale or disposition in Freeland, 74 T.C. 970 (1980). The taxpayer realized the
amount of the mortgage upon the voluntary abandonment. The court also stated, possibly
as dictum, that "the fact that petitoner realized no tax benefits in the form of depreciation
deductions while he held the property" should not determine the character of the transac-
tion. Id. at 982. This too, can be considered an expansion of Crane.
51. See, e.g., David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760 (1973), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1; Manuel D. Mayer-
son, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq., Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 21.
52. 47 T.C. 340 (1966). See David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760 (1973) for an even more ex-
treme application of the Crane rule; see also Weiss, supra note 2, at 293-94.
53. 47 T.C. at 351.
54. Id. at 352. Cf. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 76, (critical of the Mayerson decision):
[T]he Mayerson court was so concerned with the general rule that it failed to
recognize the crucial difference between Mayerson and Crane. In Mayerson, no
payments beyond the initial $10,000 were due for ninety-nine years; therefore,
there was greater doubt than in Crane that the mortgage would be paid. To give
advance credit for the amount of the mortgage when there is such uncertainty




light of Crane as precedent, since the transaction was determined
to be bona fide."
The I.R.S. acquiesced in the Mayerson decision in a Revenue
Ruling, but indicated that "the fair market value of the property
was not put at issue in the case."" The ruling warned that "[t]he
Service will continue to review transactions involving purported
purchases of depreciable property where, in the light of all the
facts and circumstances, it appears that the transactions were
designed to improperly create or inflate depreciation deductions.
In cases of this type, the Service will disallow unwarranted depre-
ciation deductions.'
7
In Marvin M. May 8 the Tax Court disallowed deductions be-
cause the transaction was a sham. The taxpayer claimed a basis of
$365,000 in several television episodes of which he personally paid
only $35,000. The transaction was found to be a sham because the
taxpayer never owned the films, he never intended to repay the
loan, and the true owners never intended that he pay. The court
concluded that "[a]lthough the transaction was dressed up to look
like a sale on the basis of which petitioner might claim $365,000
depreciation deductions, all that really occurred here was peti-
tioner's payment of $35,000 for a facade to enable him to claim
such deductions.""
Similarly, the Tax Court has disallowed deductions attributable
to basis which included debt obligations which were contingent
and unascertainable.6s The Ninth Circuit has also held that a
transaction which, in essence, consisted of an option to purchase a
motel was not an investment. 1 Since no cash would change hands
for ten years and the taxpayer could show no correlation between
55. But see Arnold L. Ginsberg, 35 T.C.M. 860 (1976); Mark Bixby, 58 T.C. 757 (1972);
Marvin M. May, 31 T.C.M. 279 (1972); Leonard Marcus, 30 T.C.M. 1263 (1971).
An argument in support of Mayerson can be made that the taxpayer's actions (purchasing
an aging, dilapidated building and rejuvenating it) should not be discouraged. Thus, there
should be an incentive, in the form of large tax deductions, available to those willing to
invest in such ventures.
56. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59.
57. Id.
58. 31 T.C.M. 279 (1972).
59. Id. at 284.
60. Leonard Marcus, 30 T.C.M. 1263 (1971); see also Gibson Products Co. v. United
States, 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex., 1978) (court held that the liability on a nonrecourse
note was contingent upon oil and gas production and therefore not a true liability); but see
Paul P. Brountas, 73 T.C. 491 (1979) (court determined nonrecourse notes on oil and gas
payments had value despite their contingent nature).
61. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
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fair market value and the purchase price, the court disallowed the
claimed deductions.
62
B. The History of Footnote 37
When one considers the potential impact of footnote 37 on dis-
positions of failing tax shelters, it is indeed surprising that it has
been the subject of little litigation."3 For the most part, references
to it were made regarding its inapplicability or that the footnote
was merely dictum. The impression is that footnote 37 has long
been considered a dead argument and those who attempted to rely
on it did so in vain. Additionally, the I.R.S., in Revenue Ruling 76-
111, expressly rejected any inference that footnote 37 could limit
the amount realized on disposition.'
The first attempt to rely on footnote 37 did not aid the taxpayer.
In Parker v. Delaney, the taxpayer argued that the value of the
property was less than the mortgage and therefore Crane did not
apply. The court was able to dismiss this contention without dis-
cussion since it found nothing in the record suggesting the value
was lower than the mortgage. The court implied, however, that if
the value was indeed less than the mortgage, the amount realized
might be limited to the value of the property. 6 The door to foot-
62. Id.
63. Of course, this may change in response to the Tufts decision. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1981). See discussion accompanying notes 106-123 infra.
64. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. This Revenue Ruling involved a reconveyance of
secured property to the seller, in consideration of the cancellation of the buyer's indebted-
ness. After deciding that the transaction was equivalent to a sale, the Commissioner held
"whatever inference may be drawn from footnote 37 in the Crane case, the unpaid balance
on the sales contract, which indebtedness was cancelled upon the transfer . . . is the
amount realized . . . regardless of the fair market value of the [property] . . . ." Id. at 215.
65. 186 F.2d at 458. Cf. Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1952). The petitioner in Woodsam had requested a finding that the value of property dis-
posed of was less than the mortgage which, under footnote 37 of Crane, he would have only
realized the fair market value of the property. The petitioner subsequently disclaimed any
reliance on footnote 37, which according to the court was "advisedly so." Id. at 358 n.1.
Woodsam, however, involved the determination of amount realized when the taxpayer bor-
rowed cash from nonrecourse borrowings after the property was already acquired. See also
Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947). In both these cases, the court stressed the fact that
"postacquisition borrowings" for the taxpayers' benefit were involved. See McGuire, supra
note 2, at 1443 and 1447-49 (1978).
Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1978), involved conveyances by a corpora-
tion of property valued at least equal to the liens securing it. The court remarked in a
footnote that "[c]onsequently, there will be no issue in this case as to what footnote 37
meant in Crane v. Commissioner." Id. at 810 n.4 (citation omitted). The Tax Court in Jo-
seph W. Johnson, quoted part of Crane and in reference to footnote 37 stated: "The [Crane]
Court indicated in fn. 37 that a different problem might be encountered if the value of the
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note 37 was opened slightly.
It was not until the latter part of the seventies that the strength
of footnote 37 was put to the test. Economic conditions in that
period apparently resulted in many "tax shelters in ruins,"66 in
that tax shelters, upon disposition, had fair market values of less
than their outstanding mortgages. This fact pattern arose in a
group of cases, and the applicability of footnote 37 was scrutinized.
In the first case, Gavin S. Millar, the Tax Court held that the
value of the property was immaterial in determining the amount
realized.6 7 The issue arose when R. H. Jamison organized a strip
mining corporation which elected to be taxed as a small business
corporation (subchapter S).68 The stock was issued to the petition-
ers for no consideration. Jamison then advanced $500,000 to the
shareholders who each issued a nonrecourse note payable to Jami-
son for the amount advanced. The security for the notes was the
stock in the corporation. The shareholders then contributed the
money advanced by Jamison to the corporation.
In the first few years, the corporation operated at a loss. Because
of the subchapter S status, the shareholders realized significant tax
benefits in the form of loss deductions." By 1967, the corporation
faced imminent bankruptcy, rendering the stock worthless. At this
time, Jamison demanded payment on the notes. When no pay-
ments were made, he foreclosed on the stock.T°
None of the petitioners reported any gain upon the transfer of
their stock to Jamison. They argued that they did not realize a
gain because the value of the stock was worthless and therefore
less than the value of the nonrecourse note at the time of foreclo-
sure. Footnote 37 was the exclusive source of their argument. The
Commissioner, however, argued that the petitioners realized a tax-
property was less than the amount of the mortgage, but stated that was not the case there.
It is also not the case here." 59 T.C. 791 at 809 n.3, affd 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
66. Bittker, supra note 1, at 277.
67. 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd sub nom. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). See Note, supra note 6. This case was originally heard by
the Tax Court in 1975, 34 T.C.M. 554 (1975), and was then appealed to the Third Circuit,
540 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1976), which remanded the case to the Tax Court, 67 T.C. 656. It was
appealed to the Third Circuit once again, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court
eventually denied certiorari, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
68. I.R.C. §§ 1371-79.
69. 540 F.2d 184, 185 (3d Cir. 1976). The shareholders also benefitted by the investment
tax credits earned by the corporation, and interest payments made by the corporation on
the notes. Id.
70. 540 F.2d at 185.
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able gain in the amount of the loan, less the adjusted basis. He too
relied on Crane, but on the main principles of the case-that basis
includes unassumed mortgages and that upon disposition, the
amount realized includes the amount of the mortgage-rather than
on footnote 37.71
The Third Circuit upheld the Tax Court's finding that according
to the reasoning of Crane, the petitioners did incur a tax liability.
7 '
The court explained that despite the factual difference between
the two cases, the principle reasoning for the Crane decision ap-
plied to MiUar. The taxpayers in both Crane and Millar had en-
joyed tax benefits and must therefore include the full amount of
the mortgage to pay back those benefits. The Millar court believed
that "[a] finding that the taxpayers did not realize gain as a result
of this exchange, after having realized the full economic benefit of
this transaction, would entitle them to the type of double deduc-
tions which the Supreme Court so clearly disapproved in Crane.""7
Thus, the court was relying almost exclusively on the tax benefit
theory of Crane as the justification for its decision.
The court did acknowledge that if footnote 37 were taken liter-
ally, it "might" provide support for the petitioners' contention that
they did not realize the amount of the loan. The court did not ac-
cept this reasoning, however, and explained:
[I]n the analysis of this problem, the footnote should be evalu-
ated in the proper context. First, it must be remembered that the
footnote in Crane was dictum. Furthermore, the footnote was but
a postulate or hypothetical observation with respect to a hypo-
thetical set of facts not before the Court and, indeed, involving a
clearly different time and clearly different legal circum-
stances .... Thus, applying Crane to the facts of the case before
us, it is clear that the transaction resulted in taxable gain to the
taxpayers by reason of the inclusion of the nonrecourse obligation
in the calculation of basis as well as the amount realized when
computing the presence or absence of gain resulting to the tax-
payers from the foreclosure of the notes and surrender of the
stock.7'
Millar provided the precedent for several cases that followed. In
John F. Tufts, the Tax Court reached the same conclusion as Mil-
71. 577 F.2d at 215.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 215.
74. Id. at 215-16.
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tar. (This Tax Court decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit in
Tufts v. Commissioner. )75 In Tufts the members of a partnership
used borrowed, nonrecourse funds to construct an apartment com-
plex. They sold the complex subject to the mortgage when the
value was less than the outstanding mortgage and claimed they re-
alized only the fair market value as gain.76 This claim was based on
footnote 37-that they did not realize an economic benefit except
the amount of the fair market value of the property." The Tax
Court determined, however, that the petitioners realized the full
amount of the outstanding liability.
78
The Tax Court has had several other opportunities to hold that
upon the disposition of property valued at less than the nonre-
course loans, the amount realized was nevertheless the full amount
of the mortgage. In Estate of Delman, the court relied heavily on
the reasoning of Millar and John F. Tufts. The court explained
the applicability of the tax benefit theory as the justification for
Millar, Tufts, and its own decision.80
In Eugene L. Freeland, the Tax Court seized the opportunity to
once more reaffirm its holdings in Tufts (then on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit) and Delman.8' The petitioners purchased land val-
ued at $50,000 with a $9,000 cash payment and a nonrecourse note
for $41,000. The land value decreased to $27,000, at which time the
petitioner reconveyed the land by quitclaim deed to the seller.
After first determining that a voluntary abandonment was
equivalent to a sale,82 the court concluded that the petitioner suf-
fered a capital, rather than an ordinary loss. The reference to foot-
note 37 was merely a rejection of the petitioner's attempted reli-
75. 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
76. 70 T.C. 756 (1978). But see Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
See discussion accompanying notes 85-92, 105 infra. The petitioners made an alternative
argument, that under I.R.C. § 752, which is considered a codification of the Crane doctrine
in determining a partner's basis 'in a partnership, the fair market value limitation of (c)
applied to the sale of a partnership interest under § 752(d). 70 T.C. at 766. See also Perry,
Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAx L. REV. 525,
543 (1972), (through an analysis of legislative history and regulations, the Tax Court con-
cluded that § 752(c) was meant to be applied very narrowly and thus, did not apply in this
case.) Id. at 767-68.
77. 70 T.C. at 764.
78. Id.
79. 73 T.C. 15, 28-30 (1979).
80. Id. at 30.
81. 74 T.C. 970. The court did this despite the fact that the issue before the court dif-
fered from that in Tufts, Delman (and Millar). Freeland concerned a determination of
whether the loss incurred by petitioners was a capital or ordinary loss. Id.
82. See note 50 supra.
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ance on it.s
Several of the above cases relied, at least in part, upon the Tax
Court decision in Tufts.8' All noted its forthcoming appeal, but
certainly none expected a reversal. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court decision. By doing so, it shook the founda-
tion of those cases which had followed Tufts and gave renewed
vigor to the argument in favor of footnote 37. More important, it
has opened the door wider to what may be perceived as a loophole
in the tax law.
IV. Tufts v. Commissioner
A. The Facts
In August 1970, John F. Tufts and several others formed a gen-
eral partnership to construct an apartment complex. They ob-
tained a loan of $1,851,500 which was insured under section
3221(d)(4) of the Federal Housing Act.85 The partnership itself was
not personally liable on the loan. The mortgage covered the entire
cost of construction which was completed in August of 1971. In the
face of deteriorating economic conditions, the partnership was
forced to lower the rents. Even so, the complex never attained full
occupancy. As a result, the partnership was unable to reduce the
mortgage principal.86
From 1970 to 1972, each of the partners individually claimed his
proportionate share of losses incurred by the partnership. By Au-
gust of 1972, the fair market value of the apartment complex had
fallen to $1,400,000. Although the principal due on the mortgage
remained $1,851,500, the partnership's basis in the property had
decreased to $1,455,740 because of the deductions taken.87 On Au-
gust 28, 1972, the complex was sold to a third party. The buyer
agreed to pay expenses up to $250, but paid no other considera-
83. 74 T.C. at 978.
84. See discussion accompanying notes 74-82, supra. See also Gibson Products Co. v.
United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981). In Gibson the Court of Appeals held that
nonrecourse notes given for the purchase of oil and gas leases were too contingent upon
potential production and thus were not loans. In a footnote, the court stated that, although
it was not deciding whether the party could increase its basis by its proportionate share of
the note, the argument that "nonrecourse indebtedness of a partnership can be included in
a partner's basis only to the extent that it equals or exceeds the market value of the prop-
erty securing the debt" was a valid one. Id. at 1045 n.8.
85. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981); Brief for Appellants at 3.
86. Brief for Appellants at 4.
87. Id. at 5.
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tion, thus acquiring the complex subject to the nonrecourse
liability.
88
Each partner had computed his basis to include his proportion-
ate share of the mortgage. They did not, however, include the full
amount of the nonrecourse liability in the determining the amount
realized upon the disposition of the property. Rather, each partner
took a long-term capital loss. The I.R.S. claimed that the full
amount of the nonrecourse liability was the amount realized upon
the sale and therefore each partner realized a taxable gain.8 9
The partners petitioned the Tax Court,90 arguing that under
footnote 37 the amount realized should be limited to the fair mar-
ket value of the property securing the liability. The court, however,
relying heavily on Millar v. Commissioner, rejected the argument
and held for the I.R.S.
91
An appeal was taken to the Fifth Circuit. The decision, which
reversed the Tax Court, must have been somewhat of a surprise to
those familiar with the judicial trend.2
B. The Holding
The Court of Appeals phrased the question precisely:
"[W]hether footnote 37 creates an exception to the Crane holding
through its clear implication that the amount realized on the dis-
position of property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage can-
not exceed the fair market value of the property." 93 Through an
exhaustive analysis of "the reasons underlying the Crane decision,"
the court concluded that a fair market value limitation was indeed
justified."
The court first addressed the Millar decision, which had rejected
a "literal" interpretation of footnote 37.9" It criticized Millar, the
Commissioner, and the Tax Court for their conclusion that the pri-
mary concern of Crane was that the taxpayer would enjoy a double
deduction. Taxpayers should not be able to take large deductions,
with only minimal personal investment, thereby benefitting by
paying less in taxes. They must be required to pay for tax benefits
88. 651 F.2d at 1059.
89. Id.; John F. Tufts, 70 T.C. 756, 761 (1978).
90. 70 T.C. 756.
91. Id.; see discussion accompanying notes 67-74, supra.
92. 651 F.2d at 1060.
93. Id..
94. Id.
95. Id. See discussion accompanying notes 67-74, supra.
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received.96 The double deduction language is invoked in support of
the tax benefit theory which the other courts and Commissioner
consider to be the principle rationale of Crane. On this reasoning
alone, the tax benefit theory does justify the Commissioner's posi-
tion in both Tufts and Millar.
The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed that the concern for
double deductions was the principle rationale underlying Crane.
The court noted that the Supreme Court had already expanded
the definition of amount realized to include its amount of nonre-
course loans. The Supreme Court's discussion of double deductions
appeared in the last paragraph of the opinion, solely in response to
Crane's alternative argument that she did not receive any income
for which she could be taxed within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment.97 The Tufts court thus experienced an acute uneasi-
ness with the double deduction and tax benefit theories as the
principle justifications for the Crane holding.98 Additionally, the
court found that deductions "have already been factored into the
gain equation through adjustments to basis." 99 Gain is computed
by subtracting adjusted basis from amount realized. Since adjusted
basis is the cost of property less any deductions, the amount of
gain will reflect those deductions taken. The court reasoned:
To account for those deductions twice in the same equation by
expanding the definition of amount realized as well as adjusting
basis downward would, we think, be taxing the taxpayer twice on
the same component of gain. The Commissioner's reliance on a
theory of tax benefit, then, is misplaced. The Code clearly pro-
vides for a "recapture" of the prior deductions, but not through
its definition of amount realized. 00
The Fifth Circuit saw the economic benefit theory as the princi-
96. 651 F.2d at 1060.
97. Id.
98. The court explains this as an "uncertainty as to the exact nature of the 'double de-
ductions' that concerned the [Crane] Court." Id. at n.4. It explains further:
We had always supposed that Congress chose to allow depreciation deductions on
the assumption that wear and tear would diminish the value of the property. In
other words, Congress decided to compensate a property owner, by allowing him
to take depreciation deductions, for an expected loss in value due to deterioration
of the property. We therefore do not understand why, if the property does in fact
decline in value as was expected, "manifest justice" requires the taxpayer to some-
how "surrender" the previous deductions or the gain that he never realized.
Id.
99. Id. at 1061.
100. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ple justification for the Crane holding. It concluded, however, that
despite the initial "facial appeal of that notion," this theory too, is
"seriously flawed." 101 A taxpayer not personally liable on mort-
gaged property will treat the mortgage as a personal obligation
only as long as he wants to keep the property.102 Thus, although
Crane (and Tufts) did receive some benefit, the court "seriously
question[ed] whether the full amount of nonrecourse debt is an ac-
curate measure of that benefit."' 03
Because of its "reservations" about Crane, the Tufts court could
not "extend [Crane] beyond the facts of that case."1 4 Thus, upon
disposition of property, a seller can include only the fair market
value of the property, as amount realized, when that value is less
than the nonrecourse debt.105
C. Analysis
Clearly, the Tufts decision was a shock to the tax field. Imagine
the reaction of the tax practitioner who, on the basis of Crane,
Parker, and Millar advised his clients that on the foreclosure of
burnt out tax shelters, the taxpayer would realize the full amount
of the nonrecourse loans as gain-a phantom gain. Most tax practi-
tioners undoubtedly told their clients that in view of the I.R.S. po-
sition and case law supporting it, there was no way to avoid this
result and that efforts to do so would be futile. Tufts, however,
changes the situation entirely.
101. Id. at 1062.
102. Id. The court refers to Professor Bittker, with whom it agrees. See discussion ac-
companying notes 27-32 supra.
103. Id. at 1063.
104. Id.
105. The taxpayers alternatively argued that § 752 requires a decision in their favor.
Sections 752(c) and (d) are as follows:
(c) LIABILITY TO WHICH PROPERTY IS SUwJcT-For purposes of this section, a
liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of
such property, be considered as a liability of the owner of the property.
(d) SALE OR EXCHANGE OF AN INTEREST-In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabili-
ties in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with
partnerships.
Briefly, the taxpayers argued that the two sections should be read in conjunction. The Com-
missioner, with whom the Tax Court agreed, argued that the sections operate independently
and actually conflict with one another. See 70 T.C. at 766-68 for a thorough discussion of
the argument and the Tax Court's treatment of it.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in a footnote only. It acknowledged both arguments
but then stated that its holding eliminates any conflict the Commissioner construes to be
within § 752. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8. See note 75 supra.
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Furthermore, tax practitioners are all too familiar with the liber-
ality with which tax shelters have been structured to permit large
tax deductions. The Millar decision seemed just, if not correct; the
benefits of large tax deductions should be balanced against even-
tual tax liability upon disposition. Therefore, most tax advisors
would instinctively accept Millar. Only the most aggressive would
suggest reporting an amount realized limited to the fair market
value under the authority of footnote 37.
Thus, the initial reaction to Tufts might be that it runs against
the grain of fairness. The Tufts decision will inevitably reduce the
taxes collected by the I.R.S. Many taxpayers will reap tax shelter
benefits-large deductions and amount realized on disposition lim-
ited by the fair market value of encumbered property.'" Interest-
ingly, the Tufts court did note that "it is somehow unfair for a
taxpayer to enjoy the benefit of substantial deductions without
having invested his own funds or placed his own assets at risk."'
1°
This concern is made more credible by the prevalence of abusive
tax shelters, created solely to obtain large tax deductions.108 But
when the overall effect of Tufts is considered, it is not only a well
reasoned opinion, but an equitable one as well.
The Tufts court did find it necessary to put its decision in its
"proper perspective." It concluded with a long, explanatory foot-
note10 9 discussing the conflict with other courts and the impact
that the decision will have on the tax shelter industry. The court
detected "a legitimate concern for potential abuses or at least mis-
uses of the tax law through various tax shelter schemes."'' 10 The
crux of Tufts, then, is not so much that the court applied footnote
37 literally, but rather the decision's effect on the tax shelter
industry.
According to the I.R.S., an increasing number of shelters are
abusive in that they involve inflated bases and lack "economic re-
ality." '' Tufts correctly attributed this problem to the taxpayers'
ability to "manipulate" basis and adjusted basis through the use of
nonrecourse financing." 2 The problem of abusive tax shelters, how-
106. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.9.
107. Id. at 1064 n.9.
108. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 283-84, for an example of an extreme application of
footnote 37. See also Tax Notes, note 34 supra.
109. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.9.
110. Id.
111. Tax Notes, supra note 34, at 863.
112. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
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ever, cannot and should not be solved through a strained interpre-
tation of the meaning of "amount realized," as in Millar. I.R.C. §
1001(b) which defines amount realized, on its face does not require
the inclusion of debt liability when the value of the property being
disposed of is less than the encumbrance.1"3
Crane expanded the definition of amount realized to include
nonrecourse liability where the value of the property exceeded the
debt. In Crane, it is readily apparent that the taxpayer did, in fact,
receive an economic benefit equivalent to cash. 14 It is an illogical
and unreasonable expansion of Crane, however, to find a similar
economic benefit in the amount of the debt liability in situations
where the value of the property is less than the debt. As the Tufts
court stated: "It is not a solution to distort the definition of
amount realized by finding an economic benefit equivalent to cash
where none exists." 1 5 It follows that the solution to the problem of
potential abuse lies in judicial, administrative, and legislative mea-
sures to prevent inflated basis and the claiming of unwarranted
deductions on those investments which lack economic reality. This
has been done to an extent by Congress with the "at risk" limita-
tions of I.R.C. § 465.11" The judiciary, too, has refused to allow de-
ductions computed on inflated basis and "sham" transactions.
1' 7
Regardless of how Congress chooses to prevent unwarranted tax
benefits, the judiciary should not take it upon itself to do so by
rewriting the statutory provision which defines amount realized.
The Millar approach to solve the abusive tax shelter problem
requires the taxpayer to pay back the tax benefits he received. Pre-
sumably, this rights an assumed wrong-deductions which never
should have been allowed. Millar errs in assuming that all transac-
tions involving nonrecourse debt are abusive; it disregards the fact
that many such investments, while tax-oriented, are economically
motivated with reasonable expectations of profit. Thus, Millar goes
too far; it penalizes the taxpayer who entered into a tax-oriented
transaction to make a profit, along with the true target-the inves-
tor seeking tax deductions only. The control of abusive tax shelters
should begin at their formation." 8 The I.R.S. should disallow un-
warranted deductions, through more effective auditing of tax shel-
113. See note 18 supra.
114. See discussion accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
115. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
116. See note 34 supra.
117. See discussion accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
118. E.g., I.R.C. § 465. See note 34 supra.
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ter returns."' Millar cannot solve the problem. Tufts, on the other
hand, recognizes that it is not the courts' role to solve the tax shel-
ter problem by stretching the Code to "recapture" some of the
benefits the taxpayers received. The court correctly states that it is
Congress' responsibility to do this but that it "has not yet done so
under the circumstances of this case."'' 0
The Tufts. decision, by itself, will undoubtedly benefit many who
have already received considerable tax advantages. But, if Tufts is
the impetus for further legislative and administrative efforts to
prevent the claiming of unwarranted tax deductions, the elimina-
tion of abusive tax shelters will be attained without violating the
definition of amount realized. If these shelters are prevented
before their inception, the Tufts decision will benefit only those
involved in tax-oriented investments which are not abusive, and
where the ultimate disposition occurs when the value is less than
the debt.
There is an additional factor which the Tufts decision did not
address. The taxpayers in Tufts (or as in any other similar invest-
ment) ordinarily have no control over fair market value. With
valid investments, it must be assumed that the value of the prop-
erty equals or exceeds the debt liability. Otherwise, deductions are
disallowed.' The reasonable expectation is that the value will not
decrease below the amount of the debt. Since a change in fair mar-
ket value is a fortuitous circumstance, a decrease is certainly be-
yond the control of the taxpayer. Abusive tax shelters should not
distort the fact that legitimate tax-oriented deals are well within
the limits of the law.
Furthermore, the nature of the taxpayers' investment in Tufts
was of the type encouraged by the availability of tax deductions.
The Internal Revenue Code is often used to "advance non-revenue
needs.' 22 In Tufts, that need was private investment in subsidized
housing.' Unfortunately, the venture proved to be economically
unsound, resulting in a decrease in value. It would be unreasonable
to encourage this type of investment on the one hand, and to dis-
courage it on the other by imposing of tax liability on phantom
gain if the venture proves unprofitable. Thus, Tufts is consistent
119. See note 34 supra.
120. 651 F.2d at 1064 n.9.
121. See notes 58-62 supra.
122. Reply Brief for Appellant at 15, Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058. See Calkins
and Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 Tax Law. 493, 508-10 (1973).
123. Brief for Appellant at 43, Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058.
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with goals other than tax collection, which are inherent in the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
V. CONCLUSION
Tufts v. Commissioner is clearly a landmark decision in several
regards. The first is obvious; it is the first decision to literally ap-
ply footnote 37. But the true impact of Tufts does not lie in its
deference to footnote 37.
The greater impact of Tufts, is its potential effect on the tax
shelter industry. Undoubtedly, there are many happy tax shelter
investors as a result of this decision. The reason is simple; they will
save taxes when they dispose of burnt-out tax shelters. Tufts can
be viewed as creating a loophole in the broad sweep of the Crane
doctrine; that upon disposition of property, the amount realized
includes nonrecourse debt. But, the Tufts decision is premised
upon the fact that it is not a loophole, but merely a refusal to un-
reasonably extend the Crane doctrine to accomplish a legislative
function.
The Fifth Circuit refused to extend the Crane doctrine to a fact
situation to which it cannot logically apply. The fact that benefits
will accrue to undeserving investors because of the Tufts decision
must not mar the logic of its reasoning.
The fact remains that Tufts conflicts with decisions of the Third
Circuit and the Tax Court. Inevitably, footnote 37 will face the ul-
timate test-the Supreme Court. Hopefully, the Court will not be
swayed by the appeal of what superficially appears fair. It need
look only as far as the logic underlying Tufts to make the correct
decision.
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